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   This Essay examines the roles of a general counsel, as the 
corporation’s chief legal officer, in responding to scandals when they 
happen and in developing and enforcing internal preventive practices prior 
to the occurrence of any particular scandal. The Essay differentiates 
between scandals and crises more generally, emphasizing the integral 
connection between scandal and jeopardy to reputation and tracing the 
interrelationships between a corporation’s reputation and that of its general 
counsel. The Essay argues that risks associated with scandal may strengthen 
general counsel’s power within the senior management team, in particular 
in general counsel’s relationship with the corporation’s CEO. Although 
general counsel’s position as a member of the senior management team may 
imperil counsel’s ability to bring detached judgment to bear, counsel’s 
position within the corporation is a critical component of effectiveness in 
anticipating and addressing scandals.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Not all organizational crises, even ones with wide-reaching 
consequences, constitute scandals. Unlike crises or adverse events more 
generally, scandals embroil identifiable actors who are (or should be) 
held responsible for the consequences of their actions. A scandal is 
triggered by conduct that offends generally shared moral sensibilities 
and that becomes the focus of sustained and general attention. For an 
organization as for an individual, the long-term taint in the wake of 
scandal may overwhelm its immediate consequences, whether financial, 
legal, or otherwise. Separately, crises that have many distinct causes 
are difficult to untangle into discrete lines of responsibility traceable to 
culpable individual actors.1 Reflecting on the near-collapse of the world 
financial system in 2008, Bear Stearns’s last CEO—his own firm a 
memorable casualty—detailed a number of macroeconomic 
developments that preceded the crisis while acknowledging that “greed 
was a factor in all this, too.”2 In the end, “these things do occur with 
some regularity, and we haven’t ever figured out how to stop the next 
one from happening.”3 To be sure, distinctly identifiable scandals may 
occur in the midst of a larger crisis.  
The underlying conduct that makes an incident a scandal often 
violates the law.4 Examples, some ongoing, of scandals centered on 
illegal or arguably illegal conduct are numerous and include: News 
Corp. and the hacking of cell phone records by employees of the now-
defunct News of the World, plus payoffs to police officers for phone-
 
 1. For a recent example, see Jesse Eisinger, The S.E.C.’s Meek Approach to 
Combating Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, at B5 (identifying multiple 
factors that explain why to date “[n]o major investment banker has been brought up on 
criminal charges stemming from the financial crisis,” the SEC has taken a risk-adverse 
pattern in civil complaints and enforcement proceedings, and “private litigation has 
failed” to take up slack in enforcement). On private-party litigation stemming from the 
2008 financial crisis, Eisinger identifies the status of many putative victims as a factor: 
“large financial institutions and money managers . . .do not want to sue because it 
could reveal their own compromised behavior. Or they would be revealing to customers 
that they had simply been taken by other, smarter bankers.” Id. 
 2. WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND 
WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 448–49 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In the same vein, “everybody tries to look at what happened in the previous six months 
to find somebody or something to blame it on. But, in truth, it was a team effort. . .. 
Government. Rating agencies. Wall Street. Commercial banks. Regulators. Investors.” 
Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. Id. at 449–50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. Ongoing investigations in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis may yet 
result in criminal indictments of specific individuals who worked on behalf of specific 
financial firms. See Jeff Madrick & Frank Partnoy, Should Some Bankers Be 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 10, 2011, at 23. 
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related information not otherwise available;5 Siemens and a widespread 
bribery scheme;6 UBS and $2.3 billion in unauthorized trades by a 
rogue employee;7 high-tech companies and backdated stock options;8 
and Hewlett-Packard’s use of pretexting to investigate its own board.9 
All were preceded by the prior decade’s financial accounting scandals 
at Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth. Some scandals involved 
lawyers whose conduct was legally culpable or otherwise problematic.10  
Scandals are also distinctive from crises because reputation is 
central to a scandal’s impact. The damage inflicted by a well-publicized 
scandal may impugn the reputations of the individuals and organizations 
involved and carry long-lasting consequences for them. Relatedly, 
individuals and organizations that wish to avoid damage to reputation 
may avoid engaging in conduct that may generate a scandal, resulting in 
a constraint on behavior that turns on the anticipated impact of a 
scandal. And attempts to mitigate adverse impacts on reputation or their 
duration often shape how organizations respond in the midst and 
aftermath of a scandal, once the underlying incident has come to light.  
This Essay focuses on the roles of a general counsel, as a 
corporation’s chief legal officer, in responding to scandals when they 
occur and in developing and enforcing internal preventative practices 
prior to the occurrence of any particular scandal. The Essay’s analysis 
and concrete examples concern publicly held corporations, in part 
because their visibility and significance are more likely to attract the 
degree of sustained media scrutiny that sparks general public interest. 
Prior scholarship explores at length the nature and sources of 
ambiguities inherent in the general counsel’s position.11 In connection 
with a corporation’s vulnerability to scandal, a general counsel’s 
position within a corporation’s senior echelons may afford deep insights 
into its weaknesses and furnish leverage to address them. However, the 
general counsel’s position may also imply tensions between the value of 
professional detachment and counsel’s natural empathy with other 
members of the senior management team. Additionally, as a member of 
that team, the general counsel’s working definition of independent 
 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 96-101. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 112-115. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 118-123. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57. 
 10. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1320 
(2006) (“Lawyers have been implicated in almost all of the major health, safety, and 
financial scandals of recent decades.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008). 
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professional judgment may be shaded by a managerialist view that de-
emphasizes compliance with legal and ethical norms or dulls their 
distinctiveness among the constraints or risk-relevant factors applicable 
to a corporation, stressing instead “the importance of protecting the 
client” from regulatory oversight and business competition.12 In Robert 
Rosen’s account, a general counsel’s power can only be exercised “at 
the executive level, in the presence of the [Vice Presidents],” the other 
“functional specialists” who serve on the senior management team.13 
Gaps may follow in corporate accountability when compliance with the 
law gives way to patterns of organizational redesign that emphasize 
“adding value” to the corporation in the measurable short term.14  
However, as Professor Rosen acknowledges, scandal may prompt 
a sharp correction in course toward greater centralization and control,15 
which would facilitate a renewed emphasis on legal and regulatory 
compliance and the distinctiveness of general counsel’s role. In 
prospective terms, the magnitude of damage—including but not limited 
to adverse legal consequences—that may follow a scandal could enable 
general counsel to engage the attention of other members of the senior 
management team, plus underline the distinctiveness of legal 
compliance, the consequences of non-compliance, and the centrality of 
counsel’s professional insights. Thus, the illegality that underpins many 
scandals should strengthen general counsel’s hand, in part because it 
implicates counsel’s technical facility with the content of the law and its 
application. Once a scandal emerges, moreover, the functions served by 
general counsel can be crucial in defining the scandal’s often-cathartic 
consequences. At that point, general counsel’s capacity to persuade the 
CEO and other members of senior management may reach an apogee. 
To make its points more crisply, the Essay differentiates among 
the stages of a scandal to demonstrate that each implicates different 
dimensions of a general counsel’s responsibilities to a corporate client, 
as well as the inevitable tensions implicit in a general counsel’s 
position. The Essay thus sketches some of the specifics of scandals that 
are relevant to a general counsel’s functions and authority. Part I begins 
by exploring and defining the distinctiveness of scandal in contrast to 
organizational crises, errors, and risks more generally. Part I also 
 
 12. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the 
Corporate Attorney/Client Relationship, in 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2009, at 478, 
533 (Colm O’Cinneide ed. 2010).  
 13. Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client 
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal 
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 666 (2002). 
 14. Id. at 681. 
 15. Id.  
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examines the definition and operation of reputation. Like scandal, the 
meaning and operation of reputation are both intuitive and complex, as 
is the insight that concern for reputation may operate as a constraint on 
potentially scandalous behavior. Moreover, the nature of reputation 
may vary as between individuals (including a general counsel and other 
lawyers) and organizations, like a corporate client. Prior scholarship 
that explores the significance of reputation to lawyers’ work 
differentiates “reputational” from “nonreputational” lawyers, placing in 
one category an outside lawyer who renders opinions on the legality of 
transactions and, in a separate “nonreputational” category, inside 
counsel.16 However useful in some contexts, this categorization slights 
the complexity of reputational issues that bear upon the roles of general 
counsel. Part II examines the stages of scandal; although these may 
overlap, the Essay demonstrates the analytic value of differentiating 
among a prelude or incipient stage, followed by a distinct stage once a 
potentially scandalous incident is known to have occurred, and then a 
postlude stage of learning and planning for the future. Part III 
concludes with a few implications for a general counsel’s sources of 
authority and effectiveness within a large corporation. These include 
the reciprocal relationships between counsel’s personal reputation as a 
professional, the corporation’s reputation and management structure, 
and the agility required for success in general counsel’s position.   
  I. DEFINING SCANDAL 
A. Crises and the Vocabulary of Crisis Management and Risk 
Management 
Many scandals fall within a subset of events that constitute 
organizational crises but have additional characteristic elements. An 
organizational crisis can be defined as “a low-probability, high-impact 
event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized 
by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a 
belief that decisions must be made swiftly.”17 Any definition of crisis 
implies that the event carries an “element of surprise.”18 In the 
scholarship of crisis management, a crisis—like many scandals—
represents a threat to “core values or life-sustaining systems” and 
 
 16. Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 
15, 28 (1995).  
 17. Christine M. Pearson & Judith A. Clair, Reframing Crisis Management, 
23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 59, 60 (1998). 
 18. John F. Preble, Integrating the Crisis Management Perspective into the 
Strategic Management Process, 34 J. MGMT. STUD. 769, 777 (1997).  
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requires urgent responses under conditions of uncertainty.19 Natural 
disasters,20 political upheaval, bank panics and other financial crises, 
and massive technological failures may all precipitate crises for 
corporations and other organizations when unlikely risks materialize. 
Within the realm of financial crises, some are susceptible to strict 
quantitative definitions while defining others requires more qualitative 
judgments.21  
Discussions of crisis management, like those of risk management, 
often use a flattened vocabulary that does not fully encompass all 
potential consequences or their causes. The managerialist orientation of 
crisis management, for example, focusing as it does on implications for 
organizational policy and operations, tends to omit symbolic 
perspectives on crises—their meaning within frameworks that legitimate 
a given order—with the consequence that decision-makers may interpret 
the significance of events within an unduly anemic framework.22 
Relatedly, the vocabulary of enterprise risk management assumes that 
risks—“potential events that may affect the entity”—may be identified 
and then managed within the entity’s overall tolerance or appetite for 
risk relative to a reasonable assurance of achieving its objectives.23 
Enterprise risk management incorporates corporate governance as a 
mechanism of managing behavioral risks with financial and technical 
 
 19. Arjen Boin, Editor’s Introduction to I CRISIS MANAGEMENT xvii (Arjen 
Boin ed. 2008). 
 20. Id. 
 21. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: 
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 4 (2009). In the first category Reinhart and 
Rogoff place inflation crises; currency crashes and debasement through reduction in the 
metallic content of coins or a new currency that supersedes an older depreciated 
currency; and bursts in asset price bubbles. Id. at 4–8. Requiring more qualitative 
evaluation are banking crises, external debt crises involving an outright default on 
sovereign debt, and domestic public debt crises. Id. at 8–14. For events within this 
latter category, endpoints for a crisis can be difficult to establish. Id. at 14. 
 22. For a fuller elaboration, see Paul ‘t Hart, Symbols, Rituals and Power: 
The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management, 1 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 36 
(1993), reprinted in 3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT, supra note 19, at 84. Hart’s initial 
illustration is the refusal of an official state funeral by the surviving families of Aldo 
Moro and anti-Mafia Judge Borsellino; the families ascribed responsibility to the state 
when Prime Minister Moro was killed by his captors and Judge Borsellino was 
assassinated. Each refusal was “a symbolic act of anger, despair and defiance” that 
underscored the larger implications of the government’s failures. Id. at 84. Each refusal 
also called into question an official interpretation of the incident that focused on short-
term and event-based concerns as opposed to broader implications for governmental 
effectiveness and legitimacy. Id. at 100. 
 23. Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of 
Enterprise Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 46 
(2010) (quoting COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE 
RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2004)). 
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risk management.24 Implicit is commensurability across risk categories, 
regardless of differences among them.25 To the extent the law is treated 
as simply a source of “risk” that may for this purpose be homogenized 
with risks stemming from other sources, it is incorporated within a risk-
management framework as another constraint on conduct, “not norms 
that express views of right conduct or desirable states of the world.”26 
Situated within a corporate client, a lawyer (including the general 
counsel) might be captivated by this neutral vocabulary; if the lawyer’s 
role is framed by members of management, counsel could be accorded 
a significant role in corporate compliance while the decision of whether 
to comply with the law could nonetheless be treated as “the ultimate 
risk management decision”27 within overall managerial responsibility 
for risk management. 
Compliance with the law fits poorly within this vocabulary. For 
one thing, as Stephen Bainbridge notes, business risk management, 
inevitably intertwined as it is with risk taking, differs in significant 
degree from questions of legal compliance.28 Failures on either score 
can lead to financial loss, but although an effective risk management 
program “can prevent risks from materializing and perhaps limit the 
impact of those that do,” a good legal compliance program additionally 
can limit the consequences of incidents of non-compliance by mitigating 
penalties.29 More generally, compliance with the law is a less complex 
question (at least in many cases) than the complexity of managing 
business risks. Whether or not to comply is a binary, yes-or-no, either-
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Commensurability across categories is also implicit in management 
literature premised on identifying and managing threats to a corporation’s ongoing 
ability to create value. Work by lawyers could be characterized as “an indispensible aid 
to manage these ongoing threats, which often involve a legal component,” which does 
not necessarily differentiate among degrees or types of legal matters. Omari Scott 
Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House 
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 83 (2011) (“[F]ailure to comply with a 
federal regulation, a poorly written supply contract, or a mishandled product lawsuit, 
all constitute a threat to corporate value.”). 
 26. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor 
after Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2003).  
 27. Kim, supra note 11, at 439. In Professor Kim’s assessment, “[f]or inside 
counsel to challenge management’s commands or self-professed authority to make such 
decisions would be perceived as a violation of inside counsel’s role commitments and 
an embarrassing disruption of a well-defined social script.” Id. 
 28. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 967, 981 (2009). 
 29. Id. at 982 (discussing an example of downward adjustments to fines under 
federal sentencing guidelines when a firm has appropriate compliance program in place 
or voluntarily discloses a violation). 
470 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
or question,30 even when determining what the law requires in 
particular circumstances requires a nuanced inquiry. Thus, failure to 
comply with the law31—particularly a considered failure to comply—has 
a stark quality of disregard of generally applicable social norms that can 
transform what might have been an incident, or under some 
circumstances a crisis, into a scandal. 
B. Scandals and Their Narrative Arcs 
A distinctive quality of scandals is their use as vehicles for the 
expression of public outrage. To be sure, crises and disasters also serve 
as focal points for expression of widely shared sentiments, but tones of 
outrage and moral disapproval are distinctive to scandals. What 
transforms an underlying incident into a scandal is its transmission to 
the public as news through media technologies. The incident becomes a 
story, narrativized into an account of moral irresponsibility on the part 
of identifiable actors.32 As an incident or pattern of incidents becomes a 
scandal, official law enforcement may respond in ways that track the 
intensity of media scrutiny.  
Consider in this light the phenomenon of stock-option backdating, 
often referred to as a “scandal.”33 Backdating is problematic in several 
respects. To back date the grant date of a stock option to an earlier date 
on which the stock traded at a lower price than the option’s exercise 
price is often inconsistent with the terms on which a corporation’s 
shareholders approved the stock option plan. More generally, by 
assuring grantees that the option is in the money when granted, the 
practice of back dating seems inconsistent with furnishing forward-
looking incentives to grantees, likely the premise on which the 
shareholders approved the option plan and the directors approved a 
particular set of grants. Backdating, which often carries adverse tax and 
accounting implications, may stem from management’s lack of candor 
with the corporation’s directors when they approve option grants. 
Academic research initially identified the possibility that some 
corporations engaged in backdating; as the practice immediately 
 
 30. Id. at 988. 
 31. Inaction by a board of directors aware of a sustained pattern of major 
regulatory violations is an example. Id. at 987. 
 32. James Lull & Stephen Hinerman, The Search for Scandal, in MEDIA 
SCANDALS: MORALITY AND DESIRE IN THE POPULAR CULTURE MARKETPLACE 1, 7 
(James Lull & Stephen Hinerman eds., 1997). 
 33. See, e.g., D.M. Osborne, Stock Option Scandals Take down a Record 
Number of GCs, CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/ 
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1165413316556 (reporting that in one year, twelve general 
counsels stepped down and “the casualty list will only grow”). 
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“resonate[d] as yet another example of executive greed and deception,” 
it had what it needed to “generat[e] substantial populist outrage” once it 
became a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal that identified 
individual corporations as suspected culprits, followed by other stories 
in the business and general press.34 In turn followed investigations by 
the SEC, which are the focus of a recent study by Stephen Choi and his 
co-authors. Relative to other SEC investigations of accounting-related 
conduct over the same period, the backdating investigations had 
consequences that diminished as the scandal wore on, implying that 
over the cycle of investigations smaller errors became the focus with 
smaller consequences.35  
More generally, in the assessment of Professor Choi and his co-
authors, the SEC’s enforcement priorities “respond[] to the salience of 
financial wrongdoing”; media coverage is a plausible proxy for 
salience36 because it likely reflects popular opinion as well as the 
interest of members of Congress who determine the level at which the 
SEC is funded.37 Additionally, this scandal’s duration and immediate 
consequences turned on the ongoing salience of the scandal’s narrative, 
itself shaped by the intensity and breadth of media coverage. In 
contrast, the occurrence of crises, their duration, and their 
consequences are more independent of ongoing media engagement. 
That is, scandal necessarily requires an audience which, as the 
backdating episodes illustrate, may include law-enforcement agencies. 
As discussed in Part II.C, this dimension of scandal implicates general 
counsel in an agent’s role on behalf of the corporation, communicating 
(or managing communications) on the corporation’s behalf with 
external audiences.  
C. Reputations: Individuals and Organizations 
Scandals by their nature often impugn the reputations of those 
involved, including lawyers. For example, over the potentially long 
shelf life of a law school text of case studies on professional 
responsibility, it is not a positive for a lawyer’s reputation to be 
 
 34. Stephen J. Choi et al., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: Salience and the 
Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations 2 (New York Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 11-20, 2012), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876725. 
 35. Id. at 29. 
 36. Id. at 35. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
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featured as a contributor to a corporate scandal.38 Reputation itself is an 
intuitive and somewhat indeterminate concept. For example, one might 
ask, “reputation for what?”39 Reputation might be limited to one issue 
or, in the case of a lawyer, one dimension of conduct; or reputation’s 
reach might be broader 40 when untrustworthiness or unreliability in one 
connection signals a broader problem. Another basic question about 
reputation is “whose reputation?” Reputation necessarily seems closely 
personalized or tightly associated with its subject, whether an individual 
or an organization, and not transferrable to others. For an organization, 
perhaps selling or licensing a product’s brand or a trade name might 
count as a transfer of reputation, but not, one suspects, necessarily so. 
In particular, organizations like law firms that furnish expert services 
dependent on the trustworthiness of individual actors might have a 
valuable “brand” in the firm’s name41 but not one comparable in 
transferability to a well-established brand name for a physically 
consumable good, such as a trademarked name associated with a soft 
drink made according to a secret formula. That’s not to deny the 
 
 38. Many examples appear in MICHAEL C. ROSS, ETHICS & INTEGRITY IN LAW 
& BUSINESS: AVOIDING “CLUB FED” (2011). Early in the book the author asks law 
students: “What can be learned from the media reports of ethical scandals in business 
and the involvement in them by lawyers?” Id. at 2. Although the book does not name 
the lawyers involved, it includes ample citations to published accounts through which a 
reader who wishes could identify lawyers by name. See, e.g., id. at 17 & n.18. 
(reporting incidents in which general counsel lacked license to practice law in the 
corporation’s headquarters state or in any state); id. at 43 & n.2 (pretexting by 
chairman and general counsel of “[a] well-known Silicon Valley high-tech company 
. . .to investigate leaks from the company’s board of directors”); id. at 111 & n.10 
(general counsel of biotech company sells shares in company on day he learns of fatal 
adverse reaction by patient to company’s new drug, having earlier placed sell order and 
then instructing broker to proceed with sale once informed of the reaction); id. at 112 
& n.13 (general counsel of semiconductor manufacturer trades on non-public 
information via information swapping-arrangement with neighbor, an employee of a 
computer hardware company).  
 39. For an incisive treatment of reputation as an explanation for compliance 
with international law, see Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 231 (2009). In particular, if a state’s reputation for compliance is 
issue-specific or specific to particular treaty partners, reputation by itself may not create 
much of an incentive for states to comply with international law. Id. at 259–62. 
Additionally, only reputation that is transferrable would translate from one area to 
another and thereby create issue-independent incentives for compliance. Id. at 261–62. 
 40. See id. at 262–66. 
 41. Thus, perhaps the reputation associated with a law firm depends for its 
durability on more than continuity over time of the name under which the firm 
operates. Cf. Okamoto, supra note 16, at 16 (commenting on prototype of business 
lawyers involved in acquisition transactions “working at an organization whose very 
name carries prestige in its community”).  
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attractiveness of discussing, in an “as-if” way, lawyers’ “brands” but 
to suggest that the relevant qualities of reputation are different.  
Reputation operates differently depending on whether its subject is 
an organization or an individual. For an organizational subject like a 
corporation, reputational consequences may be more limited or issue-
focused, and events that impugn reputation may diminish in 
significance with the departure of identified individuals who bear 
responsibility for the underlying conduct.42 Thus, for an organization 
associated with a scandal,43 it is easy to understand the attractiveness of 
an identifiable culprit with whose exit the organization’s reputation may 
be recast. When the individual identified as a culprit is not culpable, or 
not especially culpable relative to other causes, blame has been 
personalized on to a scapegoat.44 In contrast, for an individual once 
tainted by scandal, redemption may be possible but likely not through 
this route. On the other hand, the post-scandal circumstances of general 
(and other inside) counsel tainted by fraud or serious ethics violations 
warrant empirical study. If discipline by a state bar committee is 
unlikely, a post-scandal future in the legal profession remains a 
possibility, at least theoretically.45  
 
 42. Brewster, supra note 39, at 256–57 (noting that “[s]tates are not static” 
because the composition of governments can and does change, with the consequence 
that acts of a prior government that resulted in loss of reputation are not necessarily 
predictive of conduct of the new government). 
 43. As discussed later at greater length, scandal and its consequences may 
attach to an organization in a more salient fashion or in a different way than the 
scandal’s association with identifiable human actors. See infra text accompanying notes 
54–65. This calls into question the assertion in some scholarship that scandals 
necessarily require identified human culprits. See LULL & HINERMAN, supra note 32, at 
4 (“[T]he scandal differs in some ways substantively and discursively from the moral 
panic in that scandals must be traceable to real persons who are held responsible for 
their actions.”). 
 44. For a discussion of scapegoating in connection with disasters, see Thomas 
E. Drabeck & Enrico L. Quarantelli, Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters, 
TRANSACTION, no. 4, 1967 at 12, reprinted in 3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT, supra note 19, at 
146. The authors associate the personalization of fault to less culpable individuals with 
distracting attention from “structural flaws,” which in the context of the article means a 
range of authority structures and regulatory deficiencies that were substantial causal 
factors in disasters. Some scholars associate the attribution of blame following a 
disaster with unconscious feelings of guilt, which produces scapegoating and other 
irrational behaviors. Id. at 147–48. Other scholars find the primary motive to be a 
desire to assure that such a disaster does not happen again, in which persons are blamed 
when natural causes are insufficient. Id. at 148–49. 
 45. See Sue Reisinger, Punished, Debarred—But Still Members of the Bar, 
CORP. COUNS. (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/ 
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202532237528 (reporting three cases of general counsel, 
discharged from employment, who remain members of the bar; one was convicted of a 
federal criminal misdemeanor, one found guilty of ethics violations by a state utility 
474 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Additionally, when the individual in question is a professional like 
a general counsel or other lawyer, reputation operates across a broader 
scope than is true for an organization, for which reputation may be 
more closely associated with particular issues or activities. Relatedly, 
the duration over time of a professional’s reputation may be more 
evanescent because of its greater vulnerability.46 Likewise, reputation 
may be more crucial to a professional because it is so integral to the 
professional’s work. Scholars who examine the ability of lawyers and 
other professionals to serve as gatekeepers that furnish credible 
monitoring and sanctioning of clients’ compliance with the law treat 
reputation as an asset belonging to the professional, one that stems from 
a track record accumulated over time.47 To explain how law firms 
might have jeopardized their reputational capital in the accounting-
related scandals of the late-twentieth century, John Coffee identifies the 
multiple guises in which a firm may promote itself: “[t]o the corporate 
general counsel, it is the tough, relentless advocate, the hard-driving 
negotiator and the skillful planner who is able to exploit whatever 
loopholes the law offers. To investors and the public generally, it is the 
wise statesman with an impeccable reputation for integrity . . ..”48 
Thus, as applicable to any single actor, reputation has chameleon-like 
qualities that may vary with the audience.  
Finally, the meaning and operation of reputation are more complex 
(and interesting) than many accounts suggest. For a general counsel, in 
contrast to external counsel, individual reputation as a professional is 
closely linked to that of the client. On the one hand, this close tie often 
 
commission, and one lost his right to practice before the SEC as part of a settlement 
resolving charges of financial reporting fraud). The article also reports that officials of 
state bars in Texas and Indiana cannot recall any instance of bar discipline in their 
states against a general counsel. Id. Indeed, in-house lawyers from one scandal-doomed 
organization may later appear in senior positions at another. For example, the head of 
compliance at Refco, a broker that failed in a massive accounting fraud, later became 
the Senior Vice President for legal matters and head of compliance at MF Global, a 
collapsed financial firm unable to locate $1.2 billion in customer funds, according to its 
bankruptcy trustee. See Francine McKenna, Lax Law Enforcement Means MF Global 
Mistakes Will Be Repeated, BANK THINK (Nov. 11, 2011), http:// 
www.americanbanker.com/law-law-enforcement-means-mf-global-mistakes-will-be-
repeated-1044009-1.html. 
 46. On reputation’s “fleeting” or “evanescent” qualities, see Christopher T. 
Hines, Reputation as Ethical Consideration 3 n.4 (draft), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1940007) (noting that legal practitioners have “long understood this 
momentary aspect of one’s professional reputation”). 
 47. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 325–26 (2006); Hines, supra note 46, at 45 & nn.270–71. 
 48. COFFEE, supra note 47, at 326. Professor Coffee notes that for some 
purposes, “it may be necessary to insist that a law firm choose a single role that it is to 
play for a corporate client.” Id. 
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underlies the conclusion that inside counsel is ill-suited to play a 
gatekeeping role for many reasons, including economic dependency on 
one client;49 on the other hand, because a general counsel’s professional 
reputation and that of the corporation are so closely tied, a general 
counsel might well build her own reputation through effective 
interventions to establish and maintain the corporation’s reputation for 
conduct and qualities that are salient to the law.50 Of relevance in this 
connection is the phenomenon of turnover among general counsel. As 
of 2005, general counsel turnover among S&P 500 firms was about 
double that for CEOs; in 2005, twenty-nine percent of general counsel 
departed their firms, in contrast to fifteen percent of CEOs.51 The inter-
firm mobility of general counsel implies that their positions are 
consistent with developing individual professional reputations that are 
transportable to other firms. This calls into question the view that a 
general counsel’s position disables her from establishing a professional 
reputation that is transferable to another employer.52  
D. The Sticky Aftermath of Scandal  
Although some scandals constitute or are part of crises that 
threaten a corporation’s continued viability, every scandal does not 
necessarily constitute a crisis, at least a crisis with such high stakes. 
The stakes for many corporations implicated in the scandalous 
backdating of stock options were not so grave.53 However, a sequence 
 
 49. Kim, supra note 11, at 414 (arguing that conventional portrayal of 
“gatekeeping efficacy of inside and outside counsel is caricatured and exaggerated”). 
 50. Okamoto, supra note 16, at 28–29 n.33. Professor Okamoto recounts the 
reaction of the Chief Legal Officer of a large public corporation to his hypothesis that 
lawyers who work inside a corporation are “nonreputational lawyers.” Id. The Chief 
Legal Officer’s corporation offered securities for public sale with prospectuses listing 
him, not an external counsel, as the source of the opinion in the prospectus on the 
legality of the offering. Id. And beyond this transactional specific, the Chief Legal 
Officer insisted that “corporate counsel can be instrumental in establishing and 
maintaining [a] reputation” that obviates the need to obtain an opinion from external 
counsel. Id. at 29 n.33.  
 51. See Wilkins, supra note 12, at 510. 
 52. See COFFEE, supra note 47, at 195. 
 53. The resolution of backdating incidents at Apple Computer is a leading 
example of relatively mild consequences. See, e.g., Peter Burrows, Byte of the Apple: 
A Nice Tidy End to the Options Backdating Scandal, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 
14, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ByteOfTheApple/blog/ 
archives/2008/08/a_nice_tidy_end.html (reporting settlement by former general counsel 
of Apple Computer of backdating charges brought by SEC and characterizing it as a 
victory for Apple investors because it obviated the possibility of testimony by Apple’s 
CEO, Steve Jobs, who although exonerated in investigation conducted by Apple’s 
board, returned to the company at the time back dating commenced). To Steve Jobs’s 
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of scandals, each without large or immediately evident financial 
consequences, may call into question a corporation’s culture or 
reputation in wide-reaching ways. Sequential scandals associated with 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) are instructive on this score. In 2006, its Chief 
Compliance Officer (a lawyer), who reported to HP’s general counsel, 
authorized the security department’s use of false pretenses to investigate 
suspected board-level leaking, an investigative practice termed 
“pretexting.” The investigation was triggered by an expression of 
concern about leaking by HP’s Chairman to its general counsel. When 
the investigative tactics came to light, they were condemned as 
outrageous, illegal, and highly rash.54 Congressional hearings followed, 
as did federal felony charges for an investigator (to which he pled 
guilty) and state felony charges, ultimately reduced to misdemeanors, 
against HP’s Chairman (ultimately dismissed by the court), the Chief 
Compliance Officer, and two investigators.55 Additionally, the 
Chairman, the general counsel, and the Chief Compliance Officer lost 
their jobs.  
In Miriam Baer’s thoughtful account, the legal analysis undertaken 
by the Chief Compliance Officer was superficial; although more 
searching inquiry might have concluded that pretexting was outside the 
scope of federal and state prohibitions, he “should  h ave recognized 
that the risk of criminal, civil, and professional liability (not to mention 
the potential effect on HP’s reputation) was rapidly shifting” with 
greater public and official concern about pretexting.56 More generally, 
those responsible at HP seemed oblivious to the prospect that, when 
used by a private-sector corporation for its own ends, deceptive 
investigative tactics would seem abusive and less likely to be tolerable 
 
biographer, the climate within the corporation for which he was responsible “made it 
hard for someone like” Apple’s general counsel to go against his wishes, which in this 
connection required the creation of phony board minutes to show that the board had 
approved a huge grant of stock options to Mr. Jobs on a date chosen because Apple’s 
price on that date was around $18 in contrast to $20 on the later grant date. WALTER 
ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 449–51 (2011). Also implicated in the scandal was Apple’s CFO 
(also a board member) who was cited by the SEC for negligence in the paperwork 
associated with another set of option grants. Id. at 450–51. This led to the CFO’s 
resignation and his perception that he had been made a scapegoat. Id. at 451. On the 
organizational function of scapegoats in the context of scandal, see supra text 
accompanying notes 43-44. 
 54. Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: 
What Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
523, 524–25 (2008). 
 55. Id. at 531–32. 
 56. Id. at 533. 
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than deception practiced by public law enforcement agencies.57 Another 
scandal followed for HP in 2010 when its CEO Mark Hurd—relatively 
new in the job during the pretexting scandal—was forced to resign in a 
split board vote after an investigation of an allegation of sexual 
harassment proved that allegation unfounded but surfaced inaccurate 
expense reports, purportedly submitted by Mr. Hurd to conceal the 
relationship.58  
These incidents illustrate that a corporation itself may acquire a 
reputation via association with scandal that is in some ways independent 
of the foibles of identifiable individuals and that survives once the 
corporation has jettisoned them. Additionally, the consequences of such 
a reputation may not operate in synch with the reaction of financial 
markets. Throughout the pretexting scandal, HP thrived financially, 
with its stock reaching its highest price in six years.59 Nonetheless, the 
company’s successive scandals are now case studies in materials for 
law60 and business61 students, framed as exemplars of problematic 
conduct. A case study for business students continues HP’s saga, 
through a successor CEO in office for a brief eleven-month term who 
was fired by the board following the CEO’s announcement that the 
company would make major business changes and a subsequent twenty 
percent decline in HP’s stock price.62 Thereafter the board named one 
of its own members as CEO without either forming a search committee 
or naming an interim CEO. Commenting on the appointment, HP’s 
Executive Chairman said in a conference call to investors: “If we 
thought there was a better choice outside, we would have conducted the 
 
 57. See id. at 571–73. The same obliviousness may have dulled the insights of 
those responsible at News Corp. once they learned of the information-gathering tactics 
deployed at The News of the World. See infra text accompanying notes 96-101. 
 58. See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Leadership Challenges at Hewlett-
Packard: Through the Looking Glass, in CLOSER LOOK SERIES, at 1, 5 (Rock Ctr. for 
Corporate Governance, Ser. No. CGRP-21, Oct. 11, 2011), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1941849. 
 59. James Stewart, The Kona Files, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_ct_stewart. 
 60. ROSS, supra note 38, at 43–44 (pretexting scandal); id. at 76–77 (CEO 
forced to resign following investigation of sexual harassment claim and revelation of 
“relatively small amount of expense reimbursement from the company”). The latter 
incident, headed “The Boss Has Trouble,” asks the student reader to place herself in 
the role of the corporation’s general counsel, adding that shortly after his resignation 
the CEO went to work for a principal competitor, as did Mark Hurd. Id. at 77; see also 
Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 25, at 125 (noting that “reputation and brand equity,” 
as other species of business risk, “may outweigh legal risks”). 
 61. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 58. 
 62. Id. at 6  
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search.”63 That is, distinct from HP’s financial results and even the 
reaction of financial markets, HP’s reputation in the wake of successive 
scandals and fumbling would stymie the prospect of hiring a new CEO 
with suitable credentials from outside the company. Consistent with the 
distinction drawn above between individual and organizational 
reputations, the Executive Chairman attempted to sever HP from 
individuals with starring roles in prior scandals, saying “[t]his is not the 
board that was around for pretexing. This is not the board that fired 
Mark Hurd. This is not the board that did everything you want to write 
about. . ..”64 
Thus, in some situations a scandal’s aftermath may prove sticky 
for an organization even once it jettisons specific individuals closely 
associated with the scandal. This stickiness is consistent with the 
general recognition that, although immeasurable, a corporation’s 
reputation constitutes a valuable and fragile asset.65 Senior 
management’s awareness of this fact should strengthen the hand of 
general counsel, whose own reputation, as discussed above, is so 
closely linked to that of the corporation. 
  II. THE STAGES OF A SCANDAL 
A. In General: A Confession by a Rogue Trader Morphed into a Major 
Scandal 
For the reasons just explored, conduct within a corporation that 
may become the object of scandal should be of special concern to the 
corporation’s general counsel; once an incident becomes known, the 
management of its aftermath may itself create a scandal when the 
underlying incident might not have done so. Indeed, an inadequate 
response may enable subsequent conduct that leads to materially worse 
consequences for the corporation and for general counsel as an 
individual professional. An initial example frames this Essay’s 
subsequent exploration of more specifics of general counsel’s roles at 
each stage.  
 
 63. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. Id. (quoting Final Transcript: Hewlett-Packard Names Meg Whitman 
President and Chief Executive Officer Conference Call 6, Sept. 22, 2011, available at 
http://h30261.www3.hp.com/phoenix.zhtml?p=iroleventDetails&c=71087&eventID=
4204723). 
 65. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 
Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1259, 1262 (2009) (suggesting a corporation’s reputation is perhaps “its ‘largest 
uninsured asset’” (quoting David S. Margulies, Media Relations for Litigation, in 1 
ASS’N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM. CONVENTION MATERIALS (2005))). 
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In 1991, the head of the government securities trading desk at 
Salomon Brothers Inc. confessed to his immediate superior that he had 
submitted a false bid in an auction for U.S. Treasury securities held 
two months before.66 The report appears to have been precipitated by 
the trader’s receipt of a letter from the U.S. Treasury sent to a Salomon 
client (and copied to the trader) on whose purported behalf the trader 
had submitted an unauthorized bid; he did so with the objective of 
outwitting a limit imposed by Treasury on the maximum available for 
any one bidder. To be sure, 1991 may seem a long time ago in some 
respects, but the subsequent occurrence of large-scale incidents of 
rogue trading assures the ongoing salience of the Salomon Brothers 
saga.67 The trader’s immediate superior admonished him and asked if 
he had engaged in similar conduct, which the trader denied having 
done. The superior next met with the corporation’s President and its 
Chief Legal Officer and reported his conversation with the errant trader 
to them. The Chief Legal Officer advised that the trader’s misconduct 
was a serious matter (indeed it constituted a federal crime)68 and that its 
 
 66. In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, [1992 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992). All the facts that follow 
were drawn from this source. 
 67. More recent examples include Société Général, see Nicola Clark, Ex-
Trader in France Gets 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, at B1 (discussing that after a 
€4.9 billion trading loss the trader was convicted of breach of trust, forgery, and 
unauthorized use of bank’s computers), and UBS, see Victoria Howley & Emma 
Thomasson, UBS $2 billion Rogue Trade Suspect Held in London, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/us-ubs-idUSTRE87E15I20110915 
(discussing that after a $2 billion loss caused by London-based trader of Swiss bank the 
trader was arrested on suspicion of fraud). The consequences of the UBS scandal may 
range more widely than the firm itself if the incident makes tougher industry-wide 
regulations more likely, in particular through bans on proprietary trading by banks. See 
Emma Thomasson & Edward Taylor, Special Report: How a Rogue Trader Crashed 
UBS, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/us-ubs-
idUSTRE78L7IB20110926. On the phenomenon of rogue traders more generally, see 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the “Rogue Trader” 
Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301 (2000); Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 
51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 128–33 (2009) (further explaining rogue traders). 
 68.  The SEC filed a complaint against the trader, alleging violations of the 
antifraud and recordkeeping provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. SEC v. Mozer, 
Litigation Release No. 13918, 55 SEC Docket 2170 (Dec. 29, 1993). The trader was 
also indicted by a federal grand jury and pled guilty to two counts of making false 
statements about the illegal bids. See Briefly: Securities, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 1993), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-02/business/fi-41357_1_paul-mozer. A shareholder 
derivative suit settled prior to trial for $40 million, one of the largest case recoveries in 
a derivative action. See Declaration of Jeff S. Westerman in Support of Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and Service Award to Plaintiff at 17, 
Milgram v. Chase Bank, USA , No. CV 10-00336 GW (PJWX (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 
2011), available at https://www.milgramsettlement.com/pdf/Westerman%20Decl% 
20ISO%20Mtn%20for%20Attys%20Fees,%20Expenses,%20Svc%20Award%20to%20
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occurrence should be reported to the government. At a later meeting 
that included the corporation’s Chairman, the Chief Legal Officer 
stated he believed the submission of the false bid constituted a criminal 
act and that, although Salomon probably had no legal duty to report its 
commission, in reality the corporation “had no choice but to report the 
matter to the government,” either to the Treasury Department or the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.69  
Although all four participants believed that a decision had been 
made at the meeting that the President or the Chairman would make the 
report, neither did so, despite urging from the Chief Legal Officer. The 
rogue trader was not disciplined nor were limitations placed on his 
activities, such as intensified supervision. Following his disclosure to 
management, the trader submitted two more unauthorized bids in 
auctions of Treasury securities. Rumors began to circulate in the 
market of an attempt to “squeeze” the market in connection with the 
latter auction, prompting officials of the Treasury to meet with 
Salomon’s Chairman and President. Salomon eventually engaged an 
outside law firm to investigate, which led to the revelation of the 
trader’s unauthorized bids, plus a prior episode that preceded the 
incident reported to the trader’s immediate superior.  
Severe consequences followed for Salomon, including criminal 
charges against the trader, a civil suit brought by the SEC against the 
firm, shareholder litigation, and SEC administrative proceedings 
against the firm, its Chairman and its President, and the trader’s 
immediate superior. Although the chief legal officer was not named as 
a respondent in the SEC’s administrative proceeding, the SEC’s ruling 
discussed his conduct in detail and noted that “he has represented that 
he does not intend to be employed in the securities industry in the 
future.”70 Salomon paid $290 million in fines and penalties to settle 
claims arising from the false bidding matter.71 Finally, Salomon’s 
business was placed in jeopardy by a government threat to disqualify it 
from bidding at Treasury auctions, a threat countered by senior 
management’s resignation and a nine-month period in which Warren 
 
Pltf.pdf; see also Weiner v. Gutfreund (In re Salomon, Inc. S’holders Derivative 
Litig.), 68 F.3d 554, 555–56 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s holding that 
claims against defendants stemming from involvement in firm’s violations of federal 
securities laws would not be referred to arbitration under rules of New York Stock 
Exchange but would be tried in district court). In connection with this shareholders’ 
derivative suit, I prepared an expert report in anticipation of testimony at trial. 
 69. Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,601.  
 70. Id. at 83,608 n.23. 
 71. See Gretchen Morgenson, Was Someone Squeezing Treasuries?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, at 1.  
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Buffett, chairman of Salomon’s largest shareholder, ran the firm.72 In 
1997, Salomon was acquired by Travelers Group (later Citicorp).73 
This entire episode can be subdivided into distinct albeit somewhat 
overlapping stages, each with implications for the responsibilities of the 
corporation’s Chief Legal Officer. In the first stage, the prelude to the 
eventual scandal, the adequacy of the corporation’s compliance 
processes is clearly open to question, especially in light of the fact that 
the Chief Compliance Officer reported to the Chief Legal Officer. As it 
happens, Salomon’s processes enabled the rogue trader to conceal the 
submission of false bids by creating fictitious trade tickets “selling” the 
unauthorized purchases to the relevant customer accounts and then back 
again to Salomon, all “to create the appearance that the customers had 
received the securities awarded in response to the unauthorized bids and 
had sold those securities to Salomon.”74 To conceal the fictional trades 
used to conceal the unauthorized purchases, the trader also directed the 
clerk who created the trading records to prevent confirmations from 
being sent to the customers.  
When the trader confessed to his superior, his transgression was 
not yet a scandal. What made it so was the firm’s response. As the SEC 
emphasizes, the firm’s Chief Legal Officer then had knowledge of 
“serious misconduct involving a senior official of a brokerage firm.”75 
He failed to take appropriate steps to address the misconduct, including 
directing an investigation or instituting measures to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the misconduct, and in any event would have a duty to 
verify the implementation of such measures. Although the Chief Legal 
Officer was not a direct supervisor of the trader at the time he learned 
of the bid, and thus was not in a position comparable to those of the 
 
 72. See Warren Buffett and the Salomon Saga, DEALBOOK (Sept. 24, 2008), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/warren-buffett-and-the-salomon-saga/. Mr. 
Buffett, in a letter to shareholders of his Berkshire Hathaway holding company, 
characterized this period as “‘far from fun.’” Id. (quoting Letter from Warren E. 
Buffet, Chairman, to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Mar. 1, 1993), 
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1992.html). Mr. Buffett credits 
Salomon’s lead lawyer on government matters (Ron Olson): “[He was] key to our 
success in getting through this trouble. . .. If we were to resolve our problems in a 
coordinated and prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal, business 
and human skills. Ron had them all.” Letter from Warren E. Buffet, supra. 
 73. The acquisition was effected through a merger between Salomon and 
Smith Barney, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Travelers Group, forming Salomon Smith 
Barney. In 1998, Travelers and Citicorp merged to form Citigroup, Inc. See Salomon 
Brothers, CITI, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporate/history/salomon.htm (select 
“> 1990 – 1997” in center of page; then “> 1998”) (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).  
 74. Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,599. 
 75. Id. at 83,609. 
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Chairman, the President, and the trader’s immediate superior,76 the 
Chief Legal Officer in the circumstances became a “supervisor” for 
regulatory purposes with the responsibility to take appropriate action to 
respond to the trader’s reported misconduct.77 Remaining a bystander to 
fumbling by others does not fulfill this duty, either in this specific 
regulatory context or more generally when an affirmative response is 
required. Additionally, for Salomon, failure at this stage of events then 
led to the scandal that ensued once the trader, again, submitted 
unauthorized bids. The consequences for the firm intensified when 
Salomon’s senior management did not do as they had agreed and 
voluntarily report the incident to which the trader had confessed to the 
government, which led to major adverse consequences for the firm.  
Thus, each stage of this narrative calls into question the 
effectiveness of the corporation’s chief legal officer. The trader’s 
ability to submit false bids seems—at least in the bright light of 
hindsight—to imply deficiencies in Salomon’s internal controls and 
compliance systems. Once the trader confessed an incident of serious 
misconduct, his reinstallation in the same position with the same scope 
of unilateral authority implies heedlessness to the risk that he might 
again submit a false bid or engage in other illegal conduct enabled by 
ongoing loose controls. Failing to investigate at this point, either by 
using internal resources or engaging external counsel for the purpose, 
left open the possibility (which turned out to be true) that the trader’s 
prior misconduct was not confined to one incident. And the incident 
itself did not spark any inquiry into the adequacy of the firm’s 
compliance and control systems and personnel themselves. In 
particular, a complex organization may always tempt an actor to “test 
[his or her] luck against the existing controls”;78 the Salomon trader, 
 
 76. They learned, through the trader’s confession, “that a high level employee 
of the firm with significant trading discretion had engaged in extremely serious 
misconduct.” Id. at 83,606. As a consequence, they had a duty to investigate and, 
although they could seek guidance from counsel, the duty constituted “an affirmative 
obligation to undertake an appropriate inquiry.” Id. Moreover, pending the outcome of 
the investigation, they had a duty to place the trader under increased supervision and to 
limit his activities appropriately. Id. These duties stem from multiple interpretations of 
the SEC’s authority under the Securities Exchange Act to impose sanctions for 
inadequate supervision on individuals associated with a broker-dealer and on the firm 
itself when it “has failed reasonably to supervise . . .with a view to preventing 
violations [of federal securities laws], another person who commits such a violation, if 
such person is subject to his supervision.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(4) (2006).  
 77. Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,609. 
 78. Catherine Dunn, UBS’s $2 Billion ‘Rogue Trader’ Exposes Risk 
Management Failures, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.law.com/ 
jsp.cc/.jsp?id=120251491938 (quoting Professor Jerry Markham on separation of 
functions as essential to internal risk control). 
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additionally, confessed to testing his ability to evade a governmentally 
imposed constraint through illegal means.  
B. Precursors to Scandal 
It is self-evident that an organization does not become implicated 
in scandals when its employees and other agents comply with applicable 
law and do not test the boundaries of either the law or generally 
accepted norms of behavior applicable to their work.79 As illustrated 
above, some firms operate in a legal and regulatory context that itself 
imposes specific duties to supervise employees to assure compliance 
with the law and to respond appropriately to indications of 
wrongdoing.80 Within the broader ambit of general corporate law, the 
well-known opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation 81 imposes on directors a duty to assure themselves that 
“information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are 
reasonably designed to provide senior management and the board itself 
timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the 
board . . .to reach informed judgments concerning both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.”82 
Within the corporation’s senior management, the efficacy of 
compliance systems seems securely within a general counsel’s province 
of expertise, whether or not compliance functions and personnel are 
entirely situated within the corporation’s legal function. 
A recent empirical study highlights the centrality of compliance-
related functions to the role of a contemporary general counsel. Tanina 
Rostain contextualizes this development in an era of “influx of law into 
the corporation,” in which corporations had ample incentives to create 
codes of behavior, engage in compliance training, and institute controls 
and procedures to insure compliance with the law.83 Professor Rostain 
conducted a small pilot study of general counsels of Fortune 100 firms 
who “articulated a robust account of their jurisdiction over questions of 
legal risk.”84 Most reported directly to the CEO, thereby formalizing 
 
 79. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1011, 1021 (1997) (“[E]arly interception . . .is much easier than cleaning 
up a mess after the fact.”). 
 80.  See, e.g., In re Wedbush Secs., Inc., 48 SEC 963, 967 (1988) (imperative 
that those in authority in large organizations “exercise particular vigilance when 
indications of irregularity reach their attention”). 
 81. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 82. Id. at 970. 
 83. Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary 
Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 468 (2008). 
 84. Id. at 473. 
484 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
their authority, and most were confident in their ability to interdict 
conduct that posed significant legal risks.85 Although most respondents 
saw themselves as members of the corporation’s business team, they 
also understood themselves to occupy a distinctly defined gatekeeping 
role of preventing serious wrongdoing.86 They drew on their legal 
expertise as their base of influence within the corporation, in particular 
their ability to distinguish among legal risks, ranging from conduct that 
is clearly illegal to the merely questionable.87 General counsel deployed 
multiple techniques to influence behavior, including “reputational and 
ethical considerations . . ., proposing different, less risky ways to 
structure transactions, or leaving the issue to management to decide 
after providing a full discussion of the risks involved.”88  
To be sure, assuming that the respondents’ self-reporting is 
accurate, it is possible that selection effects are at work because most 
general counsels who participated in the study worked for traditional 
companies without any track record of legal problems or significant risk 
taking.89 Nonetheless, Professor Rostain’s study lends empirical 
confirmation to the general insight that sources within a company itself 
are better able to assure its integrity than outside monitors.90 Her 
respondents’ authority, grounded in their technical legal expertise, 
stemmed from the centrality of compliance matters to their work. As 
suggested above, their professional reputations would turn, not just on 
their individual probity and skills, but also on the efficacy of the 
corporation’s compliance systems, which in turn would enhance the 
corporation’s reputation for law-abiding and ethical conduct. Moreover, 
one component in the era of law’s internalization into the corporation—
the 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) legislation—had the 
effect of generating dialog within the respondents’ corporations about 
the responsibilities of directors and controls throughout the business. 
By requiring greater attention to internal controls and auditing, SOX 
engaged boards of directors and senior management in discussions that 
enhanced their awareness of their responsibilities and arguably induced 
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greater aversion to taking legally aggressive positions.91 Crucial to these 
discussions was general counsel—often serving as secretary of the 
board and thus present at board meetings—whose position was further 
empowered by SOX and its threat of criminal sanctions.  
C. Management in the Midst  
Additional dimensions of general counsel’s role become salient 
with knowledge that an incident of problematic conduct has occurred. 
These dimensions have both internal and external points of focus. As 
the experience of Salomon Bros. illustrates, a situation may warrant a 
full investigation to determine its extent and severity; it may also 
warrant a review of the design and operation of relevant reporting and 
control systems. It may also be necessary, as a practical if not legal 
matter, to report the incident’s occurrence outside the corporation to 
governmental authorities. Relatedly, the incident may bear on the 
accuracy of the corporation’s public statements that are material to 
investors.  
Foregoing or truncating an adequate investigation into allegations 
of wrongdoing has additional perils, not present in the saga of Salomon 
Bros., in particular the risk that the allegations will prove unfounded or 
that, eager to distance itself from identified culprits, the corporation 
may jettison the wrong personnel, which itself may provoke a scandal. 
Earlier this year, for example, in response to a tip that three senior 
managers were stealing intellectual property concerning its planned 
electric car, Renault investigated and fired the three managers while its 
CEO appeared on television to announce that evidence supported the 
firings.92 Two months and further investigation later, the tipster was 
unveiled as a fraud, the managers were exonerated, the CEO 
apologized (again on television), the company reassigned the officer 
who oversaw the investigation, the head of the legal department was 
fired,93 and a Renault security official was arrested “and charged with 
fraud in connection with payments [the company] made through him as 
part of its internal inquiry.”94 Additionally, the company’s internal 
investigation reportedly annoyed France’s domestic intelligence agency 
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because France owns fifteen percent of Renault but the company’s 
internal investigation did not liaise with the agency, which opened its 
own investigation.95  
More notoriously, the ongoing travails of News Corp. illustrate the 
perils of dealing with potentially scandalous incidents in ways that seem 
after the fact only to have worsened its situation in the longer term. As 
is now well-known, when incidents of illegal phone hacking at The 
News of the World came to light, no comprehensive investigation was 
undertaken, and a senior executive of News Corp. approved a 
confidential £700,000 settlement in the first lawsuit filed against the 
company.96 Had the case proceeded in court, evidence would have 
contradicted earlier parliamentary testimony by News Corp. executives 
that hacking was isolated to one rogue reporter who covered the royal 
family.97 As it happens, News Corp.’s long-time general counsel had 
resigned about a month before the scandal broke, which occurred when 
it became evident that the subjects of hacking included a young murder 
victim, in addition to the assumed celebrity targets.98 Thereafter 
responsibility for conducting an internal investigation was lodged with 
an independent director on the company’s board, who engaged several 
prominent lawyers and law firms to assist.99 To date the scandal has led 
to the loss of News Corp.’s opportunity to acquire all the remaining 
shares in BSkyB and has called into question whether its Chairman, 
Rupert Murdoch, could be succeeded by his son James, the degree of 
whose awareness of the incidents underlying the scandal is in 
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question.100 Crisis management experts fault the company for its initial 
failure to understand—or its decision to ignore—the potential magnitude 
of the problem when evidence of wrongdoing continued to emerge.101 
And likely News Corp.’s prominence as an owner of media properties, 
some of which specialized in the revelation of scandals and salacious 
behavior more generally, heightened its vulnerability to its own 
scandal.  
How prominent a role general counsel should play in interactions 
with audiences external to the corporation—especially news media—is 
an inescapable question. Acting as the corporation’s agent in dealing 
with third parties is integral to general counsel’s role, in particular in 
relationships with external counsel.102 Although traditionally law and 
public relations were understood to be separate disciplines,103 the 
engagement more recently of general counsels in managing public 
relations functions and acting as the corporation’s public spokesperson 
suggests heightened appreciation of the importance of the metaphorical 
court of public opinion.104 Moreover, as discussed above, law 
enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies like the SEC may find 
media attention salient to determining enforcement priorities.105 One 
recent empirical study finds law and public relations to be 
“intertwined,” with general counsel actively engaged, typically behind 
the scenes, in managing the media fallout of potentially scandalous 
events.106 Counsel might draft press releases, develop talking points (for 
others to deliver), and deal with implications for filings with the 
SEC.107 Managing in this setting is often an iterative process with 
public relations professionals that is not free from tensions: as one 
study respondent characterized the dynamic: “‘in a high stakes legal 
matter, PR wants to put the best spin on it and I would say this is not 
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something you could spin. You have to call just the facts and no 
spins.’”108 
This development enhances general counsel’s role as the 
corporation’s agent, encompassing as it does non-legal audiences for 
less technical messages about the corporation’s conduct. It also brings 
temptations to “spin,” to over- or under-state to try to mitigate the 
adverse impact on the corporation, even when counsel serves not as a 
direct spokesperson but an author of a script behind the scenes. At 
stake is not just counsel’s credibility to external audiences, but the base 
of counsel’s authority for audiences internal to the corporation. That is, 
excesses as an outward-looking agent in the guise of public relations 
manager may undermine counsel’s gravitas as an internal force for 
compliance with the law.  
D. Scandal as Catharsis and Its Lessons 
For some corporations, the experience of scandal results in an 
attempt to transform the organization into one that warrants a reputation 
for compliance with the law. Overcoming the taint of scandal may 
require appointing a new general counsel with both a broadly defined 
mandate and a prior reputation from which to derive credibility.109 A 
recent instance is the response of Siemens in the wake of a widespread 
bribery scandal, which ultimately led to the company’s payment of a 
$1.6 billion fine in addition to an internal inquiry and restructurings 
with an estimated cost of over $1 billion.110 At Siemens, bribery around 
the globe was an organized activity; one midlevel executive in a 
subsidiary that sold telecommunications equipment oversaw an annual 
bribery budget of $40 to $50 million.111 When Germany (Siemens’ 
home jurisdiction) joined an international convention banning foreign 
bribery in 1999, Siemens responded with an internal “‘paper program’” 
that was designedly ineffectual to staunch the outflow of funds paid as 
bribes.112 All began to collapse once international law enforcement 
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investigated, culminating in arrests in Germany in 2006 and 
investigations in the United States soon thereafter.  
Siemens hired a new general counsel (from General Electric) in 
2007 into a corporate culture that led many employees to believe that 
“bribes were not only acceptable but also implicitly encouraged.”113 His 
appointment, an integral part of the company’s settlement of charges 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, came with an expectation of 
ongoing and aggressive monitoring to be implemented within and 
funded by Siemens itself.114 In addition to redrafting internal rules, 
conducting extensive retraining exercises for employees, and instituting 
whistleblowing mechanisms, Siemens increased the size of its internal 
compliance staff from 86 in 2006 to slightly fewer than 500 and 
included experienced law-enforcement personnel in the compliance 
cohort.115 At the head is the new general counsel, who acknowledges 
that evidence of new bribery could always come to light but is confident 
that the days of systematic corruption are over.116 That he came to 
Siemens from General Electric—an acknowledged pioneer in effective 
anti-bribery techniques in the context of global operations—both 
underscores his own reputation and stakes it to future developments at 
Siemens. 
To be sure, systemic change in the context of a large and complex 
corporation can prove elusive. The Swiss bank UBS, mentioned earlier 
in connection with a recent $2 billion loss caused by a rogue trader in 
its London office,117 suggests a cautionary tale. Severely affected by the 
financial crisis that began to unfold in 2007, UBS entered 2008 with 
“significant legacy risk positions” on which it incurred major losses.118 
The bank “identified significant weaknesses in its risk management” 
practices and internal controls and, following the crisis, revamped them 
to strengthen its board’s responsibilities, adopted an integrated 
approach to risk control, and increased its emphasis on reporting.119  
The revelation of a major rogue trading incident in September 
2011 led to the resignation of UBS’s CEO, characterized as “an 
admission that the bank’s latest scandal has effectively undone all his 
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efforts over the past two years to lobby against tougher bank 
regulations.”120 The scandal also calls into question the efficacy of 
UBS’s internal controls on proprietary trading. Reportedly, senior 
managers were “‘flabbergasted’” to discover that the rogue equity 
trader at the London desk that dealt with Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs) had engaged in fake hedging transactions, concealing them by 
false entries into UBS’s systems of counterparties known to the trader 
not to require confirmation prior to the settlement date, thereby tricking 
the system into believing the fake hedges represented real 
transactions.121 The failure of UBS managers adequately to confirm the 
trades with the purported counterparties breached the bank’s internal 
rules.122 Further complications in the wake of the incident stem from 
lack of clarity whether Swiss or U.K. regulators have responsibility for 
UBS’s London unit.123 That is, the bank’s elaborate multi-jurisdictional 
structure added a layer of complexity that may have facilitated the 
rogue trader’s ability to evade detection. Thus, measures taken in the 
aftermath of one scandal may not prevent another.  
More generally, a scandal may furnish an occasion to redefine the 
general counsel’s role toward closer focus on compliance and, 
proactively, toward anticipating and defusing risk.124 Refocusing the 
general counsel’s role—and appointing a general counsel with a 
credible background in a regulatory or law-enforcement agency—is a 
mechanism through which scandal may have a cathartic effect. In turn, 
a refocused role for general counsel may require hiring a new counsel 
with credentials, background, and reputation that are consistent with the 
refocused role. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL COUNSEL 
The incidents and developments recounted in this Essay bear on 
larger questions about the position of general counsel and, in particular, 
the nature and sources of general counsel’s authority within the 
corporation and within the senior management team. In an era in which 
the design and effectiveness of internal compliance functions loom 
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large, as does the threat of scandal as a significant sanction for non-
compliant behavior, general counsel’s authority may be strengthened. 
In broad terms, this could be seen as a further example of the 
remarkable adaptability of the legal profession in the United States to 
changed circumstances. These circumstances include clients’ demand 
for legal services, which general counsel, as a member of the senior 
management team, has a role in shaping and channeling.  
In his account of the legal history of the United States, Lawrence 
Friedman characterizes lawyers as “The Nimble Profession.”125 Agility 
and alertness, the sharp-witted traits that constitute nimbleness, enable 
general counsel to adapt and respond to the internalization of 
mechanisms of legal compliance and to the heightened salience of 
scandal and relationships with external non-legal audiences in a media-
saturated era. General counsel’s authority as a member of senior 
management depends, as noted above, both on counsel’s membership in 
the corporation’s cohort at the top of its managerial hierarchy, as well 
as on counsel’s credibility as a holder of specialized expertise, arguably 
grounded in technique and knowledge that are distinctive and separable 
from skills in business management per se.126 Only the “nimble” and 
strong-willed succeed in a position grounded in two potentially 
inconsistent sources of authority, which are proximity to senior 
management and the capacity to exercise judgment as a professional in 
a detached manner.  
Scandal may also open space for persuasion in general counsel’s 
relationship with other members of senior management, in particular, 
the CEO. The jeopardy to reputation posed by a scandal and how it is 
managed, along with the potentially more concrete jeopardy to the 
CEO’s ongoing position in the corporation, may create a more alert and 
receptive audience for general counsel’s advice. Scandal, that is, 
undergirds general counsel’s capacity to serve, not precisely as a 
“gatekeeper” comparable to a financial auditor, but as a “persuasive 
counselor” who “go[es] further than simply describing the law and 
suggesting ways to comply with it. . .. [but] [i]nstead . . .affirmatively, 
proactively, and courageously tr[ies] to persuade their client,” as 
represented by the CEO, to comply with the law and, beyond literal 
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compliance, to act to minimize jeopardy to the corporation.127 Essential 
to this role is a capacity for prediction beyond the immediate specifics, 
that is, to “see around the corners” using many angles of vision.128 
And, as discussed at length in connection with Salomon Bros. and its 
rogue trading incident, remaining a bystander to fumbling by other 
members of senior management is unlikely to be an adequate response. 
This Essay also suggests that nature and operation of reputation in 
this context are more complex than may often be assumed. General 
counsel’s professional reputation is, of course, personal to that lawyer 
but also linked to dimensions of the corporation’s reputation. And 
perhaps reputation may operate in reciprocal fashion: a high-reputation 
incoming general counsel serves as a credible signal of change at a 
scandal-ridden or otherwise troubled corporation, while a general 
counsel’s success in restoring or enhancing the corporation’s reputation 
also enhances counsel’s personal professional reputation. Moreover, an 
incoming general counsel in some sense stakes his or her personal 
reputation to that of the corporation going forward, placing it in 
potential jeopardy, which may contribute to the credibility of the signal. 
Lateral mobility among general counsel suggests that, although their 
reputation is linked to that of the corporations they serve, it may be 
transferable to successive corporate employers. 
Finally, it is evident that a corporation’s reputation, like its 
“culture” more generally, is not solely the work of general counsel. 
Other members of senior management also play significant roles in 
defining a corporation’s culture, including its orientation toward 
compliance with the law and regulation.129 Choosing to serve as a 
general counsel in a particular environment—or to continue to serve 
once more fully informed—also implicates counsel’s reputation. One 
component of an organization that determines its “culture” is the 
definition of authority among senior persona within the organization, in 
particular, the relationship between a corporation’s general counsel and 
its CEO. As noted above, the emergence of a scandal may enhance the 
general counsel’s capacity for persuasion. The formal relationship 
between the CEO and the general counsel, in particular whether the 
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general counsel reports to the CEO, is also relevant. Although recent 
data report a direct reporting relationship in most large corporations,130 
in financial services firms, the percentage of general counsel who 
report directly to the CEO is much lower.131 This may imply “a less 
important position in the corporate hierarchy,”132 consistent with a 
historical pattern, at least within investment banking, that assigned 
lower status and pay levels to personnel charged with compliance in 
contrast to bankers and traders.133 Thus, formal allocations of power 
and rights of audience (like direct reporting lines) are relevant to the 
likelihood of effective service by general counsel, in addition to general 
counsel’s personal qualities. 
Although scandal is an unlikely vantage point from which to assess 
ongoing developments in the position of general counsel, it is 
nonetheless revealing. To be sure, most corporations, like most people, 
do not become the object of sustained media scrutiny and public 
outrage. The vantage point of scandal illustrates distinctions among the 
functions served by a general counsel, the distinctive sources of 
counsel’s power within the corporation, and the factors that enhance or 
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